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Abstract
This paper analyses the normative and positive foundations of the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour (UEL). The key intuitions behind all of
the main approaches to UEL exploitation are explicitly analysed as a series of formal
claims in a general economic environment. It is then argued that these intuitions can
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Introduction

What is exploitation? In political philosophy, the most general deﬁnition aﬃrms that A
exploits B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of B. Despite its intuitive appeal, this
deﬁnition leaves two major issues in need of a precise speciﬁcation, namely the kind of
unfairness involved and the structure of the relationship between A and B that allows A
to take advantage of B. There is considerable debate in the economic and philosophical
literature on both issues. Although both aspects of exploitative relations are arguably crucial,
the analytical focus of this paper is on the unfairness, or more precisely, on the economic
inequalities involved in the concept of exploitation.1
To be speciﬁc, this paper analyses the concept of exploitation as an unequal exchange of
labour (hereafter, UEL). At the most general level, according to UEL exploitation theory, exploitative relations are characterised by systematic diﬀerences between the amount of labour
that individuals ‘give’ to the economy, in some relevant sense, and the amount of labour
that they ‘receive’, in some relevant sense. Yet, there are many conceivable ways of deﬁning the amounts of labour given and received by agents, and many alternative approaches
have indeed been proposed. In his seminal book on exploitation theory alone, Roemer [32]
examines no fewer than six distinct UEL deﬁnitions,2 and many other deﬁnitions have been
proposed in the formal literature on exploitation theory.3
Given the nature of many debates in exploitation theory, alternative UEL deﬁnitions may
seem to diﬀer for relatively minor, and merely technical details (for example, concerning the
appropriate notion of labour content in general economies). At a closer look, however, some
deep theoretical cleavages emerge and diﬀerent UEL approaches incorporate such distinct
1

Alternatively, one may interpret our analysis as focusing on the measurement of exploitation, which is

relevant even in approaches that reject the idea that exploitation is (primarily) an injustice (e.g., Holmstrom
[18]; Reiman [29]; Wood [50], fn.15). For a discussion of the structural aspects of exploitation, see Arneson
[1]; Warren [49]; Veneziani [45]. Domination is central in the approach developed by Vrousalis [48].
2
In addition to the standard deﬁnition that applies to subsistence Leontief economies ([32], Part I), see
Roemer ([32], pp.121, 132-133, 168).
3
The literature is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. Classic contributions include Morishima
[25]; Duménil [6]; Foley [15]; Roemer [31]; and Flaschel [11, 12]. For a discussion, see Yoshihara [52, 53].
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normative and positive intuitions that it is legitimate to wonder whether they actually bear
any family resemblance. In some approaches, exploitation is deﬁned as a property of individuals and “refers to the relationship between a person and society as a whole as measured
by the transfer of the person’s labor to the society, and the reverse transfer of society’s labor
to the person” (Roemer [34], p.31). In others, exploitation is primarily a relation between
individuals (e.g., Holmstrom [18]; Fleurbaey [14]). The essential normative content of the
notion of UEL exploitation is also contested. According to Elster ([8], p.167), “Being exploited means, fundamentally, working more hours than are needed to produce the goods
one consumes,” and thus exploitative relations are aﬀected by saving/investment decisions.
Other authors, instead, emphasise purchasing power, rather than consumption, and the idea
that “workers give more labor to their employers than they receive through the goods their
wages can aﬀord” (Fleurbaey [14], p.653). In more traditional, Marxian approaches, the
emphasis is on unpaid, or surplus labour, deﬁned as the labour in excess of the amount
necessary to produce the means of subsistence for workers and their families, and investment
decisions do not aﬀect exploitation (e.g., Holmstrom [18]). And so on.
This paper explores the foundations of UEL exploitation in an abstract economic environment. The main purpose is to identify the core of UEL exploitation theory that is shared
by all of the main approaches in the literature. The (often implicit) intuitions incorporated
in the various deﬁnitions are rigorously formalised as separate Claims, and thoroughly examined. Then, an axiom called Labour Exploitation is formulated, which summarises the
foundations of UEL exploitation theory (the basic Claims). The axiom sets weak restrictions
on the way in which the set of exploiters and the set of exploited agents are identiﬁed in
economies with heterogeneous agents and a general production technology. It is interpreted
as a minimal necessary condition - a domain condition - to capture the core intuitions of
exploitation theory and it is shown that indeed all of the main approaches satisfy it.
It is important to stress at the outset that, although we believe that there are good
reasons to focus on labour as the variable of normative interest in economic interactions,
and in many economic contexts the notion of exploitation is inextricably linked with some
form of labour exchange,4 our aim is not to defend the normative relevance of the distributive
4

Tellingly, after criticising the UEL approach and suggesting to replace it with a deﬁnition based on prop-

erty relations (PR), in later contributions, Roemer has acknowledged the importance of labour in exploitation
theory. He has proposed that “an agent is exploited in the Marxist sense, or capitalistically exploited, if and
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aspects of UEL exploitation theory. Nor does the paper propose a speciﬁc UEL deﬁnition.
Rather, our main objective is to clarify a number of views and intuitions that are widely,
albeit implicitly held in the literature, and to provide a rigorous formal and conceptual
framework for the analysis of UEL exploitation. Although this leaves the questions of the
injustice of the allocation of labour and of the appropriate UEL deﬁnition open, a clear
statement of the foundations of UEL theory is necessary in order to tackle both issues.5
This paper represents a ﬁrst important step in the development of a novel axiomatic
framework to analyse some key issues in exploitation theory.6 For, if Labour Exploitation
provides a domain condition capturing the fundamental intuitions of UEL theory common to
all approaches, then the appropriate deﬁnition can be characterised by imposing additional
desirable properties (axiomatic restrictions) within the class of admissible exploitation forms
identiﬁed by Labour Exploitation. We return to this issue in sections 6 and 7 below.

2

The structure of UEL approaches

In order to illustrate the key conceptual issues, consider the baseline case of a two-class
economy in which one good, say corn, is produced by means of itself and labour. To be
speciﬁc, a units of corn seed and L units of (a single type of homogeneous) labour are
necessary to produce one unit of corn, where a < 1. Assume that all agents have the
same skills. Suppose further that capitalists save and accumulate, while all workers earn a
subsistence wage and consume the same (subsistence) amount of corn c. Under these rather
stringent assumptions, the deﬁnition of UEL exploitation is relatively uncontroversial. Let v
denote the amount of labour necessary to produce one unit of corn: this comprises both the
amount of labour L directly necessary in production and the amount of labour contained in
only if PR holds and the exploiter gains by virtue of the labor of the exploited” (Roemer [35], p.96). For,
“the expenditure of eﬀort is characteristically associated with exploitation” (Roemer [35], fn.11).
5
Moreover, a clear analysis of the foundations of the notion of exploitation may “help understand social
conﬂicts, because the protesters often voice complaints motivated by the feeling of being at the wrong end
of some form of exploitation” (Fleurbaey [14], p.673).
6
An axiomatic approach was long overdue in exploitation theory, where new deﬁnitions have sometimes
emerged as the result of a somewhat ad hoc process of adjustment of the theory to various problems and
counterexamples (such as Steedman’s [42] famous proof that a negative aggregate surplus value could occur
alongside positive aggregate proﬁts). Exceptions include Hollander [17] and, more recently, Yoshihara and
Veneziani [54]; Veneziani and Yoshihara [47]; and Yoshihara [52].
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the corn seed, va. Formally, v = va + L and so v = L (1 − a)−1 . Then agent ν is exploited
(resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour she expends, λν , is greater (resp., lower) than

the labour contained in c, vc.7
The deﬁnition of an agent’s exploitation status requires the identiﬁcation of three separate
normative benchmarks. The ﬁrst is the amount of labour that the agent gives, or contributes
- which, in this setting, is simply equated to the labour time performed in economic activities,
λν . The deﬁnition of the amount of labour received, instead, requires the deﬁnition both of
a relevant bundle (or, more generally, bundles) received by the agent, which can be called
the exploitation reference bundle(s) (henceforth, ERB), and of the labour associated with,
or contained in it - here, respectively, c and vc.
In the simple economy considered, all three benchmarks are relatively uncontroversial.8
As soon as the restrictive assumptions on technology, behaviour and endowments are relaxed,
however, the appropriate deﬁnition of the labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ by agents is not
obvious, and several approaches have indeed been proposed. For example, if agents have
heterogeneous skills, or diﬀerent types of labour inputs are used in production, then perhaps
the labour given by agents should be the eﬀective (e.g. skill-adjusted) labour that they have
contributed, rather than the time they expended in production. But maybe not.
Similarly, if more general technologies are considered (allowing, for example, for joint
products), the naïve generalisation of the standard approach to the deﬁnition of labour received can yield paradoxical results - such as bundles containing a negative amount of labour,
as famously shown by Steedman [42] - and so various deﬁnitions of the labour contained in
a given bundle have been proposed, focusing either on actual production activities or on
some feasible, possibly counterfactual, technology. As Roemer ([33], p.283) puts it, “If the
production set is complicated in various ways, then it is not possible to give an unambiguous
deﬁnition of what ‘labor-embodied’ means”.
Finally, if agents do not consume a given, equal subsistence bundle, then the choice of
7

In this paper, we follow the literature and consider exploitative relations within a given time period. For

a detailed analysis of the complications arising in a dynamic setting, see Elster [8] and Veneziani [44, 45].
8
This holds also in n-good economies with a n×1 subsistence bundle c and a standard Leontief technology
(A, L), where A is a square n × n nonnegative, productive matrix and L is a strictly positive 1 × n vector
describing, respectively, the amount of each input and the labour necessary to produce one unit of each of the
n goods. In this case the amount of labour directly and indirectly contained in each good is v = L (I − A)−1 ,
where I is the identity matrix.
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the ERB itself is not obvious: one may focus either on agents’ actual choices or on some
alternative (aﬀordable) bundle, or indeed bundles. The former approach takes a subjectivist
view by emphasising agents’ actual choices in the determination of their exploitation status.
Proponents of the latter approach object that a subjectivist perspective makes exploitation
depend on idiosyncratic consumption decisions so that agents who consume diﬀerent bundles
but are otherwise identical may end up having a diﬀerent exploitation status.
In the next sections, we clarify and reconstruct the foundations of UEL exploitation
theory in an abstract economic environment. We state them as formal claims that incorporate
logically weak restrictions on the deﬁnition of the three normative benchmarks - the labour
‘given’ by agents, the ERB(s), and the labour associated with the ERB(s) - that are shared
by all of the main approaches. Our purpose is not to discriminate among competing views,
but rather to deﬁne the theoretical boundaries of UEL theory. Formally, we aim to identify
a general domain for all admissible UEL exploitation forms.

3

Unequal exchange of labour: foundations

We aim to analyse UEL exploitation theory at an abstract level. Hence, in what follows,
we impose only minimal restrictions on endowments, technology and preferences, and make
no assumptions concerning agents’ behaviour - agents may be standard utility maximisers,
or they may be characterised by some form of bounded rationality. Nor do we restrict
the analysis exclusively to private market economies, and agents may adopt a variety of
institutional arrangements to coordinate economic activity.
Consider an abstract economic environment. Let N = {1, ..., N} be the set of agents,
with generic element ν ∈ N , and let M = {1, ..., M} be the set of produced commodities
in the economy. Let R denote the real numbers. Let P be the production set, describing
the technologically feasible production techniques. Elements of P - activities - are vectors
denoted as α, which describe the amount of eﬀective labour αl and the vector of produced
goods α used as inputs in order to produce a vector of outputs α.9 We follow the literature
and assume that technology displays constant returns to scale.10 Denote the vector of net
9

Formally, α = (−αl , −α, α) where αl ∈ R+ is the eﬀective labour input; α ∈ RM
+ are the inputs of the

produced goods; and α ∈ RM
+ are the outputs of the M goods.
10
Formally, P is a closed, convex cone with 0 = (0, ..., 0) ∈ P .
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outputs (outputs minus inputs) arising from α as α
b ≡ α − α.

Let ω ∈ RM
+ be a semi-positive vector of social endowments of productive assets. Let

lν > 0 describe the labour endowment of each agent ν ∈ N .11 More precisely, for all ν ∈ N ,

let sν > 0 be agent ν’s skill level. If L > 0 is the amount of time each agent is endowed
with, then lν = sν L. Similarly, if λν is the amount of time expended by ν in production,
then Λν = sν λν is the amount of eﬀective labour performed by ν.

®
Each economy has a list N , M, P, ω, (lν )ν∈N . Given this list, the set of feasible economic

: a vector z ≡ (x, Λ) ∈ Z
allocations can be identiﬁed and is denoted by Z ⊆ RNM+N
+

represents an allocation x = (xν )ν∈N of the M commodities to the N agents in the economy

and a proﬁle Λ = (Λν )ν∈N of (eﬀective) labour supplied by each agent ν ∈ N such that
P
P
there exists a production activity α ∈ P satisfying α 5 ω, α
b = ν∈N xν , αl = ν∈N Λν ,
and 0 5 Λν 5 lν for each agent ν ∈ N .12 In other words, an economic allocation is feasible

if the aggregate amount of each commodity allocated to agents can be produced given the
aggregate endowments of physical and human capital in the economy.
The ﬁrst claim of UEL theory requires that a deﬁnition of exploitation unambiguously
identiﬁes the exploitation status of every agent at any feasible economic allocation.
Claim 1. (The exploitation partition) At any allocation z ∈ Z, any deﬁnition of exploitation

identiﬁes a partition of the set of agents. Formally, there exist three pairwise disjoint subsets
of N , denoted as N ter , N ted , N n such that N ter ∪ N ted ∪ N n = N and, for every agent

ν ∈ N , either ν ∈ N ter and ν is an exploiter; or ν ∈ N ted and ν is exploited; or ν ∈ N n and

ν is exploitation-neutral.
According to Claim 1, even though exploitation may be a property of aggregates, such
as social classes, such aggregates are ultimately made of individuals with a well-deﬁned
exploitation status. Claim 1 is thus weakly individualistic in that it excludes radically
holistic (Wright et al [51]) approaches, which identify the existence of exploitation only at
the aggregate level, without any reference to (coalitions of) individuals.13 Claim 1 does
11

Although we allow for diﬀerent labour skills, we are implicitly ruling out diﬀerent types of labour used in

production. This is only for simplicity and all of the key insights of the paper can be extended to economies
with diﬀerent labour inputs. For a thorough discussion see Veneziani and Yoshihara [46].
12
The notation for vector inequalities is: for all y, y 0 ∈ Rp , y = y 0 if and only if yi = yi0 for all i; y ≥ y 0 if

and only if y = y 0 and y 6= y 0 ; y > y 0 if and only if yi > yi0 for all i.
13
Some applications of UEL theory focus on exploitative relations between countries (e.g. Roemer [32],
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not rule out approaches viewing “exploitation as a social phenomenon, and the existence of
exploitation need not imply, in principle, the existence of individual exploiters or exploited”
(Roemer [32], p.136). But it does require the exploitation status of each agent to be clearly
deﬁned: each agent must belong to one of three exploitation categories and no agent can
belong to more than one category.14
Claim 1 deﬁnes exploitation as a property, not primarily as a relation (Elster [8], p.174).
It requires exploitation status to be deﬁned at an overall allocation, and is silent about exploitation in individual transactions (unlike in approaches focusing on just acquisition, such
as Steiner [43], or disadvantage, such as Goodin [16] and Sample [38]). This does not exclude
the possibility that exploitation be diagnosed relationally, at the level of individual transactions, and agents may be exploited in some transactions, and exploiters in others. According
to Claim 1, however, the agents’ overall exploitation status should also be identiﬁed taking
into account all of their economic activities.15
In principle, Claim 1 may apply to any deﬁnitions of exploitation, including those that
focus on fair pricing (such as Joan Robinson’s [30] classic approach and, more recently, Reiﬀ
[28]) or property relations (e.g. Roemer [32], chapter 7). The next claim restricts the ﬁeld of
analysis as it deﬁnes the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour.
Claim 2. (UEL exploitation) At any allocation z ∈ Z, the exploitation status of an agent
ν ∈ N is identiﬁed by comparing the labour that ν ‘gives’, LνG (z), and the labour that ν

‘receives’, LνR (z).

Claim 2 incorporates an “idea of exploitation, as a certain kind of lack of reciprocity”
(Cohen [3], p.343), whereby an agent is exploited whenever “the labor he contributes in one
form does not return to him in another form” (Husami [19], p.44). The lack of reciprocity may
chapter 1). This is consistent with Claim 1 provided countries are seen as collections of agents.
14
Claim 1 rules out the possibility of incommensurable dimensions, or ‘spheres’, of exploitation: agents can
be exploiters in one dimension and exploited in a diﬀerent dimension, but their overall exploitation status
must be well-deﬁned and unique.
15
It may be tempting to argue that because the overall exploitation status logically depends on the outcome
of many transactions, then exploitation status must also be deﬁned at the level of individual transactions.
This is a nonsequitur: the fact that, from a positive viewpoint, the overall exploitation status depends on
the outcome of many transactions does not imply that exploitation status can, or should be deﬁned at the
level of individual transactions in a normatively relevant way. Yet, as noted above, Claim 1 is consistent
with approaches that identify exploitation also in individual transactions. See, e.g., Fleurbaey ([14], p.661).

8

be normatively relevant per se,16 or because diﬀerences in labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ reﬂect
normatively signiﬁcant inequalities. Claim 2 holds in approaches that deﬁne exploitation as
the (forced) extraction of surplus, or unpaid labour (Holmstrom [18]; Elster [9]; Reiman
[29]), but it is more general than that and it does not imply a commitment to an objective
theory of value. For the amounts of labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ by agents need not be
determined objectively, and may reﬂect agents’ preferences and beliefs. Indeed, Claim 2
does not imply a commitment to any theory of value, or to the claim that labour is the
only thing that produces value.17 It only identiﬁes labour as the key normative variable of
interest - the main unit of account of exploitation theory - and thus rules out approaches
based on wealth, income, utility, and so on. In exploitation theory, labour accounting is the
“way of characterizing what it is that people give one another ... (where ‘give’ is understood
very broadly to refer to any way in which some person undergoes a loss that ends up a gain
to another)” (Reiman [29], p.9).18
Claim 2 requires any UEL approach to determine two variables for each agent: the amount
of labour given and the amount received. Neither choice is obvious - especially if one allows
for heterogeneous skills and general technologies - and diﬀerent views can be proposed. Let
1
N
the vectors LG (z) = (L1G , ..., LN
G ) and LR (z) = (LR , ..., LR ) denote, respectively, the labour

‘given’ and the labour ‘received’ by each agent at allocation z ∈ Z.19 In all UEL approaches,
the labour ‘given’ by agent ν ∈ N is just a scalar. In simple economies with homogeneous
16

“Exploitation is wrong because ... [t]he capitalist gets something for nothing, or much for little, at the

expense of others” (Elster [9], p.39). More generally, UEL exploitation may reﬂect a deviation from some
fair reference norm in exchange (Fleurbaey [14], p.666). According to Arneson ([1], p.213), “Exploitation
is one important form of mistreatment. To be exploited is roughly to be forced to perform drudgery to an
unfairly great extent, and to receive in return an unfairly small share of goods” (as measured in the labour
numéraire).
17
See, for example, Buchanan ([2], p.46); Roemer ([34], p.62); Cohen ([3], ch.11); Fleurbaey ([13], p.181;
[14], p.654); Vrousalis ([48], p.138).
18
This is what Amartya Sen ([40], p.177) has called the “descriptive interpretation of the labour theory
of value,” whose main purpose is to provide, on the one hand, “a description of production that focuse[s]
on human beings” and, on the other hand, the foundations of a normative approach whereby “personal
participation can be seen as the basis of entitlement of fruits of production.” For an alternative justiﬁcation
of labour accounting in exploitation theory, see Roemer ([32], pp.283-288).
19
Whenever this entails no ambiguity, for each ν ∈ N , we write LνG and LνR instead of LνG (z) and LνR (z)
for the sake of notational simplicity.
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labour, it is equal to the labour time expended by ν in production.20 In more general settings,
however, various deﬁnitions of LG (z) can be adopted, which incorporate diﬀerent normative
intuitions. In order to focus on the core intuitions of UEL exploitation theory shared by all
approaches, we leave LG (z) unspeciﬁed while assuming that LνG is a scalar for all ν ∈ N .
We return to this issue in section 6 below.
The deﬁnition of the labour that each agent ‘receives’ is more controversial, and many
diﬀerent proposals can be (and have been) made even in economies with homogeneous labour.
For the labour ‘received’ by an agent at an allocation z ∈ Z is not necessarily captured by

a single number and each LνR could be a (possibly inﬁnite) set of labour amounts related,

for example, to an agent’s set of aﬀordable bundles. There is therefore signiﬁcant scope for
major theoretical diﬀerences in the deﬁnition of LR (z). However, some theoretically relevant
restrictions can be identiﬁed that are common to all of the main approaches.
In all UEL approaches, for agent ν to be classiﬁed as exploited, she must ‘give’ more
labour - and thus have a higher LνG - than it would be necessary to classify her as an
exploiter, everything else equal (that is, for given consumption, income, preferences, and so
on). Formally, exploitation status is said to be increasing in LG (z) if for any two allocations
P
P
z, z 0 ∈ Z such that x = x0 , LR (z) = LR (z 0 ), and ν∈N Λν = ν∈N Λ0ν , the following three

statements hold: for each agent ν ∈ N , (i) LνG (z) > LνG (z 0 ) holds whenever ν is exploited

at z and is an exploiter at z 0 ; (ii) ν is exploited at z whenever LνG (z) > LνG (z 0 ) and ν

is exploited at z 0 ; and (iii) ν is an exploiter at z 0 whenever LνG (z) > LνG (z 0 ) and ν is an
exploiter at z. Then:
Claim 3. (Labour monotonicity) Exploitation status is increasing in LG (z).
Claim 3 is considered to be so obvious that it is never explicitly stated in the literature.
That it embodies a core intuition of UEL theory is particularly evident in Roemer’s ([32],
part I) subsistence economies in which all agents receive the same amount of labour in all
20

Some UEL approaches - such as Emmanuel’s [10] classic analysis of international inequalities - focus

exclusively on the sphere of exchange and consider as exploitative any transactions in which bundles of
goods are exchanged which embody diﬀerent amounts of labour. In these approaches, LG (z) and LR (z)
correspond to the labour embodied in the bundles that agents give up and receive in exchange, respectively.
Although the axiomatic framework proposed in this paper encompasses these approaches, too, we shall not
analyse them in detail because they focus mostly on international relations and, more importantly, their
normative foundations are unclear (see Roemer [32] and Schweickart [39]).
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equilibrium allocations and perform diﬀerent amounts of labour depending on their physical
endowments. Or in his sequence of examples with subsistence consumption but diﬀerent
institutional arrangements and distributions of productive assets (e.g., Roemer [33]). Yet,
Claim 3 is clearly shared by all UEL approaches.21
Together with Claim 1, Labour monotonicity implies that, at any allocation z ∈ Z, the
exploitation status of each agent ν ∈ N can be deﬁned by identifying at most two cut-oﬀ
values Lνmin (z) , Lνmax (z) such that ν is exploited if and only if LνG (z) > Lνmax (z) while ν

is an exploiter if and only if LνG (z) < Lνmin (z). In other words, the information contained
in the potentially complex object LνR (z) can be reduced to a focus on the upper and lower
bounds of the labour ‘received’ by ν, Lνmin (z) , Lνmax (z), which can be called the reference
labour amounts.22
By Claims 1 and 3, we can reformulate the core idea of UEL exploitation.23
Claim 20 . (UEL exploitation) At any allocation z ∈ Z, for all ν ∈ N , there exist Lνmin , Lνmax

with Lνmin 5 Lνmax such that agent ν is an exploiter if and only if LνG < Lνmin ; exploited if and
only if LνG > Lνmax ; and exploitation-neutral if and only if Lνmin 5 LνG 5 Lνmax .
Claim 20 provides a precise statement of UEL exploitation theory at a general level. However, in order to have an operational deﬁnition, it is necessary to impose further theoretical
restrictions on LR (z). This is by no means trivial. For there are up to 2N reference labour
amounts potentially ‘received’ by agents at any allocation z ∈ Z. So the question is; how
are (Lνmin (z) , Lνmax (z))ν∈N determined? Or, equivalently, how do agents ‘receive’ labour?

Let C ⊆ RM be the set of conceivable bundles of commodities, and let C(z) = (C 1 , ..., C N )

describe the set of consumption opportunities for each agent at z ∈ Z, where C ν ⊆ C, for all

ν ∈ N .24 For each agent ν ∈ N , C ν may describe either the actual allocation of commodities

to ν, or more generally a set of bundles that capture ν’s consumption possibilities at x.25

The next claim states that at an allocation z ∈ Z the amount of labour received by each
21

Formally, while all other claims considered in this paper hold at a given allocation, Claim 3 embodies a

property of UEL exploitation across allocations. This is standard in the literature where the properties of
exploitative relations are often analysed by comparing diﬀerent (possibly counterfactual) allocations.
22
That is, for any z ∈ Z, either LνR (z) ∈ [Lνmin (z) , Lνmax (z)] or LνR (z) ⊆ [Lνmin (z) , Lνmax (z)] holds.
23
For every ν ∈ N , Lνmin 5 Lνmax follows from the disjointness of N ter , N ted , N n in Claim 1.
24
Again, we are writing C ν instead of C ν (z) for notational simplicity.
25
Strictly speaking, C ν captures “allocation” opportunities, for the M goods in the economy are not necessarily consumption goods. With this proviso, we use the more descriptive term “consumption opportunities.”
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agent depends on her consumption opportunities.
Claim 4. (Sensitivity to consumption opportunities) At any allocation z ∈ Z, there exist

a C(z) and a proﬁle of correspondences F = (F 1 , ..., F N ) such that LνR = F ν (C ν ), for all
ν ∈ N.

Claim 4 states that agents ‘receive’ labour via (sets of) commodity bundles that capture
- in some relevant sense yet to be speciﬁed - their consumption possibilities, and it requires
that the labour received by each agent, LνR , be related to a (set of) reference commodity
bundle(s), C ν . “[E]xploitation theory views goods as vessels of labor, and calculates labor
accounts for people by comparing the ‘live’ labor they expend in production with the ‘dead’
labor they get back in the vessels” (Roemer [34], p.31).
In some Marxist approaches, for example, the labour received by workers - necessary
labour - is determined by looking at “the value of those goods required for [their] own subsistence” (Buchanan [2], p.37). Hence C ν is a singleton and coincides with “the subsistence
basket taking into account historical as well as moral considerations” (Desai [5], p.21). Claim
4 is more general: C ν could be a set of vectors, and it could be related to the agents’ subjective preferences, choices, and income, or it could be just a conceivable (set of) reference
bundle(s).26 Thus, Claim 4 also captures the intuitions of approaches that do not explicitly
focus on the labour embodied in speciﬁc bundles of goods, such as the ‘New Interpretation’
(Duménil [6]; Foley [15]), according to which LνR is equivalent to the amount of social labour
agents receive a claim to via their income - that is, their income multiplied by the value of
money.
Claim 4 says nothing about the relation between C ν and LνR . For each agent ν and each
C ν , F ν is a purely normative construct that identiﬁes the labour ‘received’ by ν based on the
set of consumption opportunities C ν . Claim 4 does not specify how F ν translates the sets
of consumption opportunities into amounts of labour: F ν could be either a (single-valued)
function or a (set-valued) correspondence; no restrictions are imposed on its shape; and it is
allowed to be agent-speciﬁc. Given Claims 20 and 3, however, we know that, for each agent,
at most two reference amounts of labour are necessary in order to deﬁne her exploitation
26

It is worth stressing again that Claims 1-4 (and indeed Claims 5-9 below) do not imply a committment

to an objectivist approach to exploitation, as they allow subjective tastes, choices, and beliefs to determine
the key elements of a UEL account. More on this in section 6 below.
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status. Then, by Claim 4 it is reasonable to require that all relevant information in C ν be
summarised into at most two reference bundles, for each agent ν.
Claim 5. (Exploitation reference bundles, ERBs) At any allocation z ∈ Z, for each ν ∈ N ,

there exist cνmin , cνmax ∈ C ν and a function f ν such that Lνmin = f ν (cνmin ) and Lνmax = f ν (cνmax ).
Claim 5 implies that, for each agent ν ∈ N , the reference labour amounts, Lνmin , Lνmax , can
be interpreted as the amounts of labour associated with, or contained in some theoretically
relevant reference commodity bundle(s), the ERBs. In the standard view, an input-output
approach is adopted to determine employment multipliers which uniquely identify the unit
labour content of each commodity, and a fortiori the labour content of any bundles of goods
(for a discussion, see Morishima [24, 25]; Flaschel [11, 12]). Claim 5 is much weaker: it only
requires that any deﬁnition of UEL exploitation has a well-deﬁned (albeit possibly implicit)
notion of labour associated with, or contained in, the ERBs.
Claims 1 through to 5 represent the basic conceptual framework of UEL exploitation
theory. In UEL theory, every agent is characterised by the tuple, < LνG , LνR >, which
determines her exploitation status (Claims 1 and 2). Diﬀerent approaches can be interpreted
as diﬀerent ways of specifying such tuple. However, in general, ceteris paribus, if an agent is
exploited, she gives more labour than if she is an exploiter (Claim 3). For any ν ∈ N , the
labour received by ν, LνR , is related to ν’s consumption opportunities (Claim 4). Further,

although LνR could be a large (potentially inﬁnite) set, in order to determine exploitation
status it is suﬃcient to focus on at most two values, Lνmin , Lνmax , for each agent (Claim 20 ).
Thus, for each ν ∈ N , the amount of labour received is determined by the amount of labour
associated with, or contained in some relevant commodity bundle(s), the ERBs (Claim 5).27

4

The exploitation reference bundles

Claims 1 through to 5 are not a complete theory of exploitation. They provide a rigorous
framework to conceptualise UEL exploitation, and the theoretical choices of diﬀerent approaches, in terms of restrictions on < LνG , LνR >. Concerning LνR , Claim 5 implies that in
order to deﬁne the exploitation status of each agent, it is necessary both to select the relevant ERBs, cνmin , cνmax , and to identify their labour content - that is, the (possibly implicit)
27

Recall that, for the time being, no restriction is imposed on LG (z).
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function f ν that associates a reference labour amount with each ERB. In general economies,
neither choice is obvious, and various deﬁnitions have, in fact, been proposed. In this section,
we explore some additional restrictions on cνmin , cνmax and f ν that aim to incorporate formally
weak, theoretically robust, and widely shared intuitions in UEL exploitation theory.
For each agent ν, let ω ν ∈ RM
+ be ν’s endowment of productive assets. Let (p, w, r) be
the vector describing, respectively, the prices of commodities and labour, and the rate of
return on capital at allocation z ∈ Z.28 Then, let B(ω ν , lν ; p, w, r) be ν’s set of potentially

aﬀordable bundles or, in market economies, her potential budget set at z.29 The next claim
requires cνmin , cνmax to be in the set of economically feasible choices for agent ν.
Claim 6. (Economic feasibility) At any allocation z ∈ Z with a price vector (p, w, r),
cνmin , cνmax ∈ B(ων , lν ; p, w, r) for all ν ∈ N .

Claim 6 stipulates that the ERBs, which determine the amount of labour ‘received’ by
agent ν - and, ultimately, agent ν’s exploitation status, - be related to the agent’s aﬀordable
choices or, in market economies, to her income. Claim 6 clearly holds in UEL approaches
that take the ERB to be unique and equal to the workers’ subsistence basket.30 But it is
also true in more general approaches that abandon a subsistence view and deﬁne labour
received by workers focusing on “commodities whose value is equivalent to the wages he
receives” (Buchanan [2], p.37), or “the amounts of wage goods which they can buy with
the wages they receive” (Morishima [24], p.46). As Roemer ([35], p.90) aptly puts it, at
the most general level, labour received by an agent is determined looking at the amount of
labour contained “in the goods he can purchase with his revenues from production (which
may come from wages, proﬁts, or the sale of commodities)”.
Yet Claim 6 does not require that cνmin , cνmax exhaust income, i.e. be on the budget
line, nor does it constrain the way in which they should be chosen. By focusing on potential,
rather than actual or realised income, Claim 6 allows for many diﬀerent views concerning the
28

Because we are not assuming economic activities to be coordinated by competitive markets, (p, w, r) could

be either actual or hypothetical (shadow) prices and we could further generalise the analysis by allowing
for diﬀerential wage rates, proﬁt rates and even prices of commodities. Yet this would signiﬁcantly increase
notational intensity without adding further theoretical insights.
29
Formally: B(ω ν , lν ; p, w, r) ≡ {cν ∈ C | pcν 5 wlν + rpω ν }.
30
Indeed, the weak notion of economic feasibility formalised in Claim 6 is (implicitly) endorsed even in
approaches that deny the relevance of income distribution for the determination of exploitation status, and
the rate of exploitation, while focusing on the concept of necessary labour (e.g., Holmstrom [18], pp.360ﬀ).
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appropriate choice of the ERBs: they may coincide with the bundle actually purchased by
agents at z ∈ Z,31 or they may measure some potential, or normatively relevant, commodity

bundles that are actually or only potentially aﬀordable.32 The latter approach is important,

for example, in modal deﬁnitions in which exploitation status “cannot be established just by
looking at actual behaviour” (Elster [8], p.173).
Claim 6 imposes an economic feasibility condition on the ERBs. Following classic UEL
exploitation theory, Claim 7 requires that cνmin , cνmax be also technologically feasible as net
output of some production process. For any c ∈ RM
+ , let φ (c) be the set of activities that

produce at least c as net output.33 Then:

Claim 7. (Technical feasibility) At any allocation z ∈ Z, φ (cνmin ) 6= ∅ and φ (cνmax ) 6= ∅
holds for all ν ∈ N .
The emphasis on production conditions is standard in the traditional Marxist view according to which the amount of labour received by workers is equal to the value of labour
power. Because labour power is a produced commodity, its value is given by the amount
of labour necessary to produce it, which is “identical with the amount of time required to
produce the means of subsistence of the worker” (Cohen [3], p.340; see also Morishima [25],
p.614). According to Roemer ([31], p.54), “the value of labor power possesses a complex
determination, whose origins are in the method of production.” But, more generally, in the
UEL approach exploitation is a speciﬁc wrong rooted in the sphere of production (Cohen
[3], p.345; Elster [8], p.167; Fleurbaey [13], p.184), and formal UEL deﬁnitions “map from
the fundamental relations of production into the labour market and from this to the market
of commodities, and then invert the mapping so as to go from the market of the ﬁnal goods
back to the production relationship” (Morishima and Catephores [26], p.43).
Claim 7 requires the ERBs to be technically feasible as net output of some production
31

According to Elster [8], for example, the ERBs should be related to agents’ actual consumption choices.

For “the use made of the revenues may be relevant to the moral status of their distribution” (Elster [8],
p.177) and one may wish to distinguish between consumption and investment.
32
Yet, Claim 6 incorporates an emphasis on current economic data that contradicts approaches focusing
on historical injustice, such as Steiner’s [43]. For Claim 6 requires that the ERBs (and thus the amount of
labour received by agents) be determined based on actual, current endowments rather than, counterfactually,
on the endowments that would have emerged had no prior rights violation occurred.
33
Formally, φ (c) ≡ {α ∈ P | α
b = c}.
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process.34 This is because the direct labour used to produce a bundle c as net output allows
one to capture the total amount of labour contained in the ERBs, namely “the embodied
labour - direct and indirect - in producing c from scratch” (Roemer [32], p.148). A focus on
net output is also natural in those UEL approaches that deﬁne embodied labour such that
total labour performed in the economy in a given period is equal to the labour contained in
net national product, and conceive of exploitation as measuring (using a labour metric) how
net national product is parcelled out to individuals.35
Claims 6 and 7 impose restrictions on the choice of ERBs, but are silent on the labour
contained in cνmin , cνmax . The next two claims focus on the function f ν that associates a
reference amount of labour to each ERB.
¡
¢
Let s = s1 , ..., sN . Claim 8 is a natural complement to Claim 7 in that it requires that

the reference amounts of labour also be related to production conditions.

Claim 8. (Reference labour amounts) At any allocation z ∈ Z, the reference amounts of

labour Lνmin = f ν (cνmin ) and Lνmax = f ν (cνmax ) depend on the amount of labour necessary to
produce cνmin , cνmax . Formally, for all ν ∈ N , there exist production processes ανmin , ανmax ∈ P

such that ανmin ∈ φ (cνmin ) and ανmax ∈ φ (cνmax ), and a proﬁle of positive linear transformations
(κν (P, s, z))ν∈N such that Lνmin = κν (P, s, z) · ανl min and Lνmax = κν (P, s, z) · ανl max .

Claim 8 imposes a restriction on the function f ν that associates a reference labour amount
to every ERB by stipulating that it be constrained by the properties of the production
process. The notion of labour contained adopted is by no means metaphysical and bears no
conceptual relation with the disputes on the labour theory of value. The labour contained in
the ERBs is a well-deﬁned amount related to current technical conditions,36 and to the direct
amount of (eﬀective) labour used in the production process. Contra Steedman [42], Claim
8 rules out negative reference labour amounts, because the labour contained in the ERBs,
and thus the labour received by agents “should be non-negative by deﬁnition” (Morishima
and Catephores [26], p.32; see also Flaschel [12], p.18).
34

Claim 7 may be considered as a strong requirement if each agent has diﬀerent bundles cνmin , cνmax . Yet it

is easily satisﬁed for realistic choices of cνmin , cνmax , or if the set P possesses some standard properties (such
as free disposal; see Veneziani and Yoshihara [47]).
35
For example, Flaschel [11, 12]; Duménil [6]; Foley [15]; and Fleurbaey ([13], p.171). See also the discussion
in Morishima and Catephores ([26], pp.42-43) and Roemer ([34], pp.30-31).
36
Rather than the labour actually used in the past to produce a certain bundle of goods (Cohen [3],
pp.346ﬀ).

16

According to Claim 8, the reference labour amounts may be quantities of eﬀective labour,
but this is not a requirement: diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the positive linear transformations
(κν (P, s, z))ν∈N will correspond to diﬀerent notions of the labour ‘received’ (as well as
‘given’) by agents, and the appropriate choice of (κν (P, s, z))ν∈N may depend on the normative use of the concept of exploitation (Fleurbaey [13], pp.176-177).37 We return to this
issue in section 6 below.
A focus on production and on the notion of labour contained in the ERBs may seem
restrictive in that it rules out, for example, approaches focusing on exchange whereby the
reference amounts of labour are determined based on labour commanded - that is, on the
amount of labour power that an agent may purchase on the market with her income. This
should not be a major concern. Although they do not enter Claim 8, considerations of
purchasing power or, more general, aﬀordability are relevant in the framework proposed so
far, especially in Claim 6. In general, Claim 8 allows for the possibility that price magnitudes
and market relations enter the deﬁnition of labour contained in the ERBs (Roemer [32];
Flaschel [11, 12]). Further, although Claim 8 does impose some restrictions on f ν , they are
extremely weak and the choice of reference amounts of labour remains signiﬁcantly open.
For, there may be many ways of producing the ERBs, and so the sets φ (cνmin ) and φ (cνmax )
may be very large.38 Claim 8 imposes no restrictions on the way in which Lνmin and Lνmax are
chosen among the (possibly inﬁnite) labour amounts of activities in φ (cνmin ) and φ (cνmax ).
Given that our aim is to identify the foundations of UEL exploitation theory, and derive
a domain condition that incorporates the intuitions of all of the main approaches, there is
no reason to impose any strong restrictions on f ν . Diﬀerent restrictions may appropriately
reﬂect alternative views on UEL exploitation, or may be desirable in diﬀerent economic environments.39 Yet, a common assumption in the UEL literature is that, however determined,
37

Actually, the axiomatic framework could be generalised further by allowing for nonlinear transformations

(κν (P, s, z))ν∈N in Claim 8, or by comparing LνR and LνG by means of a general binary relation % (which is
not necessarily equal to the inequality =), and letting Lνmin = ανl min and Lνmax = ανl max in Claim 8. Given
the focus of this paper, however, we have opted for the more transparent approach in terms of inequalities
and restricting Claim 8 to linear transformations, consistently with the rest of the literature.
38
If the production set P satisﬁes a standard free disposal condition, then for any c ∈ RM
+ , the set φ(c)
may have an uncountably inﬁnite number of elements.
39
Maybe reference labour amounts should be determined based on the production techniques actually used
at a given allocation (see, e.g., Flaschel [11, 12]). But maybe not. Claim 8 allows for approaches focusing on
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the reference amounts of labour be well-deﬁned and unique.
Claim 9. (Production objectivism) At any allocation z ∈ Z, for any ν, μ ∈ N , if cνmin = cμmin
and cνmax = cμmax , then Lνmin = Lμmin and Lνmax = Lμmax .

According to Claim 9, if the ERBs of two agents are equal, then the associated reference
labour amounts should be the same: the labour associated with, or contained in the ERBs
should be uniquely identiﬁed based on production conditions and not on idiosyncratic subjective factors. To put it diﬀerently, Claim 9 does not impose any restrictions on how the labour
contained in the ERBs should be deﬁned, but it does require that it be uniquely determined.
Although there are many conceivable ways of determining Lνmin and Lνmax , Claim 9 states
that such diﬀerences should be at the level of the theory, and not of arbitrary individual
characteristics. It is important to stress that this does not imply that subjective preferences
and individual choices are irrelevant in determining exploitation status. It only means that
the labour contained in the ERBs should not depend on the identity of the agents’ receiving
them.
Claim 9 holds in the standard Marxian approach, whereby the labour content of a bundle,
however deﬁned, is uniquely determined and exploitation status is independent of agents’
subjective characteristics. According to Morishima ([24], p.181), for example, a fundamental
property of a deﬁnition of exploitation is that “each worker has to be shown to be equally
exploited by the capitalists.” Yet, Claim 9 seems reasonable also more generally and it is
widely shared in UEL approaches: as argued by Yoshihara and Veneziani [55], one of the
essential, if not deﬁning characteristics of exploitation as a normative construct in political
philosophy is its (weakly) objectivist thrust.40 “If an agent could change from being exploited
into being an exploiter simply as a result of a change of tastes, some of the moral connotations
of exploitation would be lost” (Elster [8], p.174). Claim 9 seems the weakest, and most easily
defensible, part of a general objectivist theory of UEL exploitation. For if labour is ‘received’
via some commodity bundles, then it seems natural to require that a single reference amount
of labour be associated with any ERB.
Claims 6-9 complete the analysis of the basic structure of UEL approaches. In UEL
possibly counterfactual (e.g. ‘optimal’ in some relevant sense) techniques, as in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 below.
40
More strongly, Roemer ([32], p.110) has argued that the notion of exploitation “should be independent
of the subjective preferences of agents, as whether an agent is exploited should be an objective fact over
which he has no control.”
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exploitation theory, the exploitation status of an agent ν ∈ N is characterised by the tuple,
< LνG , LνR >, denoting the labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ by her. The labour received by
each agent ν, LνR , is related to ν’s consumption opportunities and is determined by the
amount of labour associated with, or contained in some relevant commodity bundle(s), the
ERBs. Claims 6-9 provide some basic restrictions on the choice of the ERBs, and on their
labour content. For every agent ν, the ERBs should be potentially aﬀordable (Claim 6) and
technically feasible (Claim 7). The labour associated with, or contained in the ERBs is (a
linear function of) the amount of labour necessary to produce them (Claim 8), which should
be well-deﬁned and uniquely determined independently of subjective factors (Claim 9).41
As shown below, Claims 1 through to 9 are theoretically salient and identify the contours
of UEL exploitation theory, while deﬁning a rather large domain of admissible approaches.

5

Labour exploitation

Claims 1 through to 9 identify the common structure underlying diﬀerent approaches to
UEL exploitation. In this section, we formalise an axiom, called Labour Exploitation, that
incorporates Claims 1-9. The axiom is a domain condition: it captures the core intuitions
of UEL theory and so, we argue, it identiﬁes the domain of admissible exploitation forms.
Labour Exploitation (LE): Given any deﬁnition of exploitation, the set of exploited agents
N ted ⊆ N and the set of exploiters N ter ⊆ N should have the following property. Given an
economy with (P, s), at any allocation z ∈ Z with a price system (p, w, r), there exist a proﬁle

of positive linear transformations (κν (P, s, z))ν∈N and a proﬁle (cνmin , cνmax )ν∈N satisfying

production objectivism such that for each agent ν ∈ N , cνmin , cνmax ∈ B(ων , lν ; p, w, r) and for
cν

cν

some αcmin ∈ φ (cνmin ) and some αcmax ∈ φ (cνmax ) with αl max = αl min :
ν

ν

cν

ν ∈ N ted if and only if κν (P, s, z) · αl max < LνG ,
cν

ν ∈ N ter if and only if κν (P, s, z) · αl min > LνG .
41

It should be emphasised that Claims 7-9 do not provide a general theory of the determination of labour

content. For they do not focus on all conceivable or even feasible bundles of commodities c ∈ RM
+ . Indeed,

they impose restrictions only on a (potentially very small) subset, {cνmin , cνmax }, of the set C ν of consumption
opportunities of each agent ν. Moreover, they hold at a given allocation z ∈ Z, and impose no restrictions
on the determination of labour content across allocations.
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LE captures the core insights of UEL exploitation theory common to all of the main approaches.42 It summarises Claims 1-9: at any feasible allocation z, the exploitation status of every agent ν is determined by the diﬀerence between the amount of labour that ν
‘gives’ to the economy, and the amount she ‘receives’. Whereas the former quantity is left
unspeciﬁed, LE requires that the labour received by agents be determined by identifying
two (possibly identical) ERBs, cνmin , cνmax , which must be (at least potentially) aﬀordable
and technically feasible, and their associated labour content which is equal to (a linear
cν

transformation of) the labour necessary to produce them as net output, κν (P, s, z) · αl min ,
cν

κν (P, s, z) · αl max . The amount of labour that ν receives is the (potentially degenerate)
h
i
cν
cν
interval κν (P, s, z) · αl min , κν (P, s, z) · αl max , and so, for any ν ∈ N , if LνG is more (resp.,
cν

cν

less) than κν (P, s, z) · αl max (resp., κν (P, s, z) · αl min ) then ν is regarded as ‘giving’ more
(resp., less) labour than ν receives and therefore a member of N ted (resp., N ter ).

The key intuitions behind LE are contained in Claims 1-9, and we refer to the previous
sections for a detailed discussion. Indeed, it can be shown that a deﬁnition of exploitation
satisﬁes Claims 1-9 if and only if it satisﬁes LE. Two additional points, however, are worth
making here, which highlight some further implications of Claims 1-9.
First, LE allows for the possibility that all agents in the economy be either exploited or
exploiters, that is, it allows for the possibility that N ted = N , or N ter = N . Both cases seem
rather peculiar and one may argue that they should be ruled out. However, given the nature
of LE as a minimum domain condition, it is appropriate to adopt a weaker formulation.
For even some of the classic deﬁnitions of exploitation - such as Morishima’s [25] - do not
exclude these cases. We return to this issue in the concluding section.
Second, LE requires that both the ERBs and their labour content be determined with
reference to production, but otherwise imposes no restrictions. In UEL approaches, however,
it is often required that only eﬃcient production processes be considered in order to determine
exploitation status. This is in line with Marx’s notion of socially necessary labour time, and
it is also intuitive as it seems objectionable to allow for exploitative relations emerging
exclusively from productive ineﬃciencies and mistakes.
Let ∂P ≡ {α ∈ P | @α0 ∈ P such that α0 > α} denote the set of eﬃcient production activities. The next claim restricts the deﬁnition of reference labour amounts to eﬃcient
42

LE generalises similar axioms analysed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [54], Yoshihara [52], and Veneziani

and Yoshihara [47].
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processes.
ν

Claim 10. (Productive eﬃciency) At any allocation z ∈ Z, for all ν ∈ N , αcmin ∈ ∂P and
ν

ν

ν

αcmax ∈ ∂P with α
b cmin ≯ cνmin , α
b cmax ≯ cνmax .

By Claim 10, the ERBs should be producible as net output of eﬃcient production activ-

ities. The notion of productive eﬃciency adopted is extremely weak, in that it requires that
there be no activity that can produce strictly more of every output by using strictly less of
every input (including labour). Claim 10 is thus quite mild and plausible, and one may argue
that LE should be strengthened to incorporate it.43 According to Morishima ([24], p.180),
for example, in the computation of labour amounts one should focus on “those techniques
by the use of which the amount of labour needed to produce given amounts of commodities
can be minimized.” From a normative viewpoint, these are the techniques that maximise
the productivity of human labour (ibid., p.184), and “if the worker owned all the necessary
means of production himself, all he would have to do would be to work only the minimum
amount of hours [necessary to produce his wage-goods]” (Morishima and Catephores [26],
p.41; see also Roemer [31], p.38; [32], pp.168-173). From a positive viewpoint, ineﬃcient
techniques are at best a transient epiphenomenon in a competitive economy. Yet, one may
argue that if the normative emphasis of UEL theory is on participation in productive activities, then actual labour time is what matters since it “describes actual participation” (Sen
[40], p.178; see also Flaschel [11, 12]). Thus, consistently with our aim of capturing the core
of UEL exploitation theory, we have stated Claim 10 separately because most, but not all of
the UEL approaches endorse productive eﬃciency.
To verify that LE captures the core tenets of UEL theory, we now show that all of the
main deﬁnitions in the literature satisfy it. For the sake of concreteness, we shall consider
allocations z = (Λ, x) ∈ Z with a price system (p, w, r) that are market-feasible in that

pxν = wΛν + rpων holds for all ν ∈ N , and if xν is the commodity bundle actually purchased
by agent ν ∈ N then in what follows we shall denote it as cν .

For any bundle c ∈ RM
+ , let l.v. (c) denote the minimum amount of (eﬀective) labour

necessary to produce c as net output.44 In his classic deﬁnition, Morishima [25] focuses on
the bundle actually purchased by an agent, cν , and deﬁnes its labour content as l.v. (cν ):
43

Claim 10 is indeed imposed in the formulations of Labour Exploitation in Yoshihara and Veneziani

[54]; Yoshihara [52]; and Veneziani and Yoshihara [47].
44
Formally, l.v. (c) ≡ min {αl | α ∈ φ (c)}.
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Deﬁnition 1

(Morishima [25]): Consider any market-feasible allocation z with prices

(p, w, r). Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies Λν and purchases cν , is exploited if and only if
Λν > l.v. (cν ) and an exploiter if and only if Λν < l.v. (cν ).

Deﬁnition 1 has some desirable characteristics, according to Morishima ([25], pp.616618): the notion of exploitation is well-deﬁned because, under weak assumptions concerning
the production set, l.v. (c) is unique, well-deﬁned and positive whenever c 6= (0, ..., 0) and
exploitation status is determined prior to and independent of price information, as in the
standard Marxian approach, focusing only on production data.
According to Roemer [32], however, Deﬁnition 1 is conceptually ﬂawed because it embodies a merely technological concept of value and “is independent of the social relations
of production” (Roemer [32], p.152), as it identiﬁes exploitation status based on production
techniques that may never be used by proﬁt-maximising capitalists. Like Morishima [25],
Roemer [32] focuses on the bundle actually bought by agents, cν , but argues that its labour
content should be given by the minimum amount of (eﬀective) labour necessary to produce
it as net output among proﬁt-rate-maximising activities at given equilibrium prices, for only
the latter production processes will be activated in a capitalist economy.
Let a market-feasible allocation z = (Λ, x) ∈ Z with a price system (p, w, r) be an

equilibrium allocation whenever for any ν ∈ N , (xν , Λν ) is preferred by ν to any other

0ν
(x0ν , Λ0ν ) satisfying x0ν ∈ RM
5 lν , and px0ν = wΛ0ν + rpω ν .45 For any bundle
+, 0 5 Λ

c ∈ RM
+ , let l.v. (c; p, w, r) be the minimum amount of (eﬀective) labour necessary to produce

cν as net output with a proﬁt-rate-maximising activity at given equilibrium prices.46 Then:

Deﬁnition 2 (Roemer [32], chapter 5): Consider an equilibrium allocation z with prices
(p, w, r). Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies Λν and purchases cν , is exploited if and only if Λν >
l.v. (cν ; p, w, r) and an exploiter if and only if Λν < l.v. (cν ; p, w, r).
45

An equilibrium allocation is essentially a Reproducible solution as deﬁned by Roemer ([32], pp.64, 114).

A thorough discussion of this notion goes beyond the boundaries of this paper. Intuitively, a reproducible
solution involves individual optimisation, nonnegative aggregate excess demand in all markets of produced
goods, and market clearing in the labour and/or credit market.
n
l
46
Formally, let P π (p, w, r) ≡
α ∈ P | pα−rpα−wα
= maxα0 ∈P
pα

pα0 −rpα0 −wα0l
pα0

ities that maximise the rate of return on capital at prices (p, w, r).
π

min {αl | α ∈ φ (c) ∩ P (p, w, r)}.
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o

be the set of activ-

Then, l.v. (c; p, w, r)

≡

Although they preserve many standard insights of exploitation theory, Deﬁnitions 1 and 2
have been criticised because exploitation status depends on counterfactual amounts of labour
content (Flaschel [11, 12]). For the production activities yielding l.v. (cν ) or l.v. (cν ; p, w, r)
may be diﬀerent from those actually used in equilibrium. According to critics, this use of
counterfactuals is theoretically undesirable and makes exploitation an empirically vacuous
notion, since the computation of l.v. (cν ) and l.v. (cν ; p, w, r) requires information that is
not available, including, in Morishima’s own words, “information about all the available
techniques of production, actually chosen or potentially usable” ([25], p.617, italics added).
The third deﬁnition considered here is an extension of the so-called ‘New Interpretation’
M
(Duménil [6]; Foley [15]).47 For any p ∈ RM
+ and c ∈ R+ , let B (p, c) be the set of bundles

that cost exactly as much as c at prices p.48 Let αp,w,r ∈ P be the aggregate (proﬁt-ratemaximising) production activity at an equilibrium allocation z with prices (p, w, r).
Deﬁnition 3 : Consider any equilibrium allocation z with prices (p, w, r) and aggregate
proﬁt-rate-maximising production activity αp,w,r . For each c ∈ RM
αp,w,r , let
+ with pc 5 pb

τ c ∈ [0, 1] be such that τ c α
b p,w,r ∈ B (p, c). The labour content of c at z is τ c αp,w,r
.
l

Deﬁnition 3 identiﬁes the labour associated with, or contained in any nonnegative bundle

of goods. By Deﬁnition 3, the labour content of aggregate net output, α
b p,w,r , is equal to

total social labour, αp,w,r
, and for any bundle c whose value does not exceed national income
l

pb
αp,w,r , the labour contained in c is equal to the fraction τ c of social labour necessary to

produce a fraction of aggregate net output, τ c α
b p,w,r , that has the same value as c.49 As

in Roemer’s [32] approach, in Deﬁnition 3 the labour content of a bundle can be identiﬁed
only if the price vector is known. Yet social relations play a more central role, because the
deﬁnition of labour content requires a prior knowledge of the social reproduction point αp,w,r
and labour content is explicitly linked to the redistribution of total social labour. Then:
Deﬁnition 4 (New Interpretation): Consider any equilibrium allocation z with prices (p, w, r)
and aggregate proﬁt-rate-maximising production activity αp,w,r . For any ν ∈ N , who supplies
ν

Λν and purchases cν , let τ c be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 3. Agent ν is exploited if and only
ν

ν

if Λν > τ c αp,w,r
and an exploiter if and only if Λν < τ c αp,w,r
.
l
l
47

See Yoshihara and Veneziani [54]; Yoshihara [52]; Veneziani and Yoshihara [47, 46]
©
ª
Formally: B (p, c) ≡ y ∈ RM
+ | py = pc .
49
If pb
αp,w,r = 0, then τ c is actually undetermined, but in (rather special) equilibria in which the value of
48

aggregate net output is zero, it seems reasonable to impose that τ c = 0.
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ν

In other words, for any agent ν ∈ N , τ c represents ν’s share of national income, and so
ν

τ c αp,w,r
is the share of social labour that ν receives by earning income barely suﬃcient to buy
l
cν . Thus, in the New Interpretation, the notion of exploitation is related to the production
and distribution of national income and social labour, and depends on empirically observable
magnitudes. Yet, Deﬁnition 4 has been criticised because, unlike Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, the
actual bundles purchased by agents are only indirectly relevant to determine exploitation
status, and unlike Deﬁnition 1, the notion of exploitation depends on price information.
In summary, various deﬁnitions can be, and have in fact been, proposed. They have
diﬀerent normative and positive implications, and yet all of them share the fundamental
insights of UEL exploitation theory as stated in Claims 1-9. Indeed, they all satisfy LE.
To see this, note that in all of the three approaches examined, for all ν ∈ N , LνG = Λν

and κν (P, s, z) = 1, and the ERB is unique. In Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, the ERB corresponds
to the bundle actually purchased by agents cνmin = cνmax ≡ cν ∈ B (ω ν , lν ; p, w, r). However,
in Deﬁnition 1, the labour content of the ERB is the minimum amount of labour necessary to produce it among all conceivable production activities, whereas in Deﬁnition 2 it is
the minimum amount of labour necessary to produce the ERB among all proﬁt rate maximising processes.50 In Deﬁnition 4, given an equilibrium allocation z with prices (p, w, r)
and aggregate proﬁt-rate-maximising production activity αp,w,r , the ERB is deﬁned counterfactually as the proportion of net aggregate output that the agent may purchase with her
ν

ν

income cνmin = cνmax = cνe ≡ τ c α
b p,w,r ∈ B (ω ν , lν ; p, w, r), where τ c =

pcν
,
pαp,w,r

and its labour

ν

ν

content is given by the corresponding share of aggregate social labour, αce ≡ τ c αp,w,r .
As in Yoshihara [52], it can also be shown that Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 would satisfy LE if they

were reformulated to be independent of agents’ consumption choices - as suggested by Roemer
([32], chapter 4) - by focusing, for example, on the maximum and the minimum amounts of
labour that agents can receive with their income so that cνmin , cνmax ∈ B (ω ν , lν ; p, w, r) but

in general cνmin 6= cνmax 6= cν . Similarly, it would be straightforward - albeit notationally
intensive - to show that other deﬁnitions satisfy LE, including the input-output approach
proposed by Flaschel [11, 12]; the variant of Deﬁnition 2 that focuses on any activities in
φ (c) ∩ P π (p, w, r), and not only labour-minimising ones (Roemer [32], pp.164-168); and even
the subjectivist approach developed by Matsuo [22], according to which the labour contained
50

Formally:

in

Deﬁnition
ν

π

1,

αc

ν

∈

arg min {αl | α ∈ φ (cν )};

arg min {αl | α ∈ φ (c ) ∩ P (p, w, r)}.
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in

Deﬁnition

2,

αc

ν

∈

in a vector c corresponds to the minimum amount of labour necessary to produce another
bundle c0 as net output, which gives at least as much utility as c.51
This conﬁrms that LE incorporates the main insights of UEL exploitation theory shared
by all of the main approaches.

6

Reﬁnements

The purpose of the previous analysis is primarily descriptive: Claims 1-9 aim to disentangle
and clarify the intuitions behind all UEL approaches. Despite the seemingly irreconcilable
diﬀerences between deﬁnitions focusing on physical or monetary magnitudes, actual choices
or potential consumption, objective data or subjective preferences, actual or counterfactual
production processes, and so on, LE identiﬁes - at a deep conceptual level - a fundamental
structure that deﬁnes UEL exploitation theory in all of its variants - even though this
structure, and the notions of ERBs and their labour content are usually left implicit.
By capturing the foundational intuitions common to all UEL approaches, Claims 1-9 can
be interpreted as deﬁning the boundaries of the admissible class of UEL exploitation forms
and LE can be seen as a domain axiom that all UEL deﬁnitions should satisfy. From this
perspective, Claims 1-9 at the same time identify the common foundations of UEL theory
and provide the formal and conceptual framework to examine the normative and positive
implications of diﬀerent deﬁnitions.52 For the boundaries of UEL theory identiﬁed by LE
are extremely wide and potentially include an inﬁnite number of conceivable deﬁnitions - i.e.
an inﬁnite number of ways of specifying the ERBs, the reference labour amounts, and LνG .
In this section, we illustrate this point by showing how the diﬀerences between alternative
deﬁnitions concerning two important aspects of UEL exploitation can be conceived of as
diﬀerent reﬁnements of, or restrictions on LE.
A ﬁrst important issue concerns the relevance of individual choices in determining exploitation status. In LE, the amount of labour that agent ν receives is determined by some
reference bundle(s) that ν can in principle purchase. In the standard approach, however, the
ERB is the bundle cν actually chosen by agent ν at allocation z. Thus, the standard view
51
52

Provided the same (representative) utility function is used for all agents, or else Claim 9 is violated.
For example, Flaschel’s ([11], pp.440-1, 449 and [12], pp.17-20) discussion of the desirable properties of

the concept of labour values can be interpreted as identifying a set of reﬁnements of Claims 7-9.
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can be captured in the following additional restriction:
Claim 11a. (Consumer subjectivism) At any allocation z ∈ Z, cνmin = cνmax = cν for all
agents ν ∈ N .
The theoretical justiﬁcation for Claim 11a rests on the idea that UEL exploitation status
should be deﬁned based only on actual economic data. Disregarding agents’ consumption
choices implies identifying their exploitation status based on information that is potentially
at odds with their actual situation and well-being.53
This subjectivist view is not uncontroversial. Following the standard Marxian approach,
for example, one may insist that exploitation status depend on production decisions, and not
on possibly idiosyncratic consumer choices. From this viewpoint, agents who are identical
in all characteristics, except possibly in their consumption choices, should have the same
exploitation status. This view can be formalised in the following Claim:
Claim 11b. (Consumer objectivism) At any allocation z ∈ Z, for any two agents ν, μ ∈ N ,
if B(ω ν , lν ; p, w, r) = B(ω μ , lμ ; p, w, r) then cνmin = cμmin and cνmax = cμmax .

Claim 11b is called ‘Consumer objectivism’ because it does not rule out the possibility
that subjective factors matter in other aspects of UEL exploitation theory - for example, by
deﬁning LνG as the agents’ actual labour supply or even by introducing subjective elements
in the determination of the labour ‘content’ of the ERBs (as in Matsuo [22], see above).
Next, note that in our previous axiomatic analysis, we have left LνG unspeciﬁed because
there is no widely shared view on the appropriate deﬁnition of the labour ‘given’ by agents
in general economies with heterogeneous labour. In particular, two main approaches can be
distinguished which focus either on the eﬀective labour contributed, or on the labour time
expended by agents. The former approach can be formalised as follows:
Claim 12a. (The contribution view) At any allocation z ∈ Z, the amount of labour
that each agent ‘gives’ is the eﬀective labour that she contributes in economically relevant
activities, namely LG (z) = Λ = (Λ1 , ..., ΛN ). Correspondingly, for all ν ∈ N , κν (P, s, z) = 1
and the reference labour amounts are Lνmin = ανl min and Lνmax = ανl max .
53

One may also support Claim 11a on the grounds of consistency if LνG is equal to actual (eﬀective) labour

supply. For, “If we wish to deﬁne exploitation with reference to the labor an agent actually expends ... then
we must admit the preference-relatedness of exploitation in any case” (Roemer [32], p.133).
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By Claim 12a, both labour ‘given’ and labour ‘received’ are measured in terms of eﬀective
labour. This is the natural extension of all of the classic deﬁnitions of exploitation in the
Okishio-Morishima-Roemer tradition, as noted in section 5 above, and it is the standard
approach in the literature on exploitation in economies with heterogeneous labour (see, e.g.,
Krause [20]; Duménil et al [7]). Moreover, the ‘contribution view’ incorporates an important normative intuition: an eﬃcient and UEL exploitation-free allocation coincides with
the proportional solution, a well-known fair allocation rule whereby every agent’s income is
proportional to her contribution to the economy (Roemer and Silvestre [37]). Proportionality is a strongly justiﬁed normative principle, whose philosophical foundations can be traced
back to Aristotle (Maniquet [21]), and it can be justiﬁed in terms of the Kantian categorical
imperative (Roemer [36]).54
Alternatively, one may argue that UEL exploitation theory captures some inequalities
in the distribution of material well-being and free hours that are - at least prima facie of normative relevance (Fleurbaey [13, 14]).55 For example, they may be deemed relevant
because material well-being and free hours are two key determinants of individual well-being
freedom (Rawls [27]; Sen [41]). But they are also relevant in approaches that link exploitation
and the Marxian notion of alienation in production (Buchanan [2]). From this perspective,
the key variable of normative interest is labour time:56
Claim 12b. (The well-being view) At any allocation z ∈ Z, the amount of labour that each
agent ‘gives’ is the labour time that she spends in economically relevant activities, namely
LG (z) = λ(z) = (λ1 , ..., λN ). Correspondingly, the reference labour amounts for each agent
ν ∈ N are Lνmin = κν (P, s, z) · ανl min and Lνmax = κν (P, s, z) · ανl max .
In Claim 12b, the positive linear transformations (κν )ν∈N are necessary to transform units
of eﬀective labour into labour time, and are left undeﬁned as there are in principle various
theoretically relevant speciﬁcations. For example, suppose that LR (z) is assumed to capture
54

The contribution principle (‘To each according to his contribution’) is also one of the principles of justice

analysed by Marx in the Critique of the Gotha programme (Husami [19]; Miller [23]; Cohen [4]; Warren [49]).
55
Cohen ([4], p.203) aptly refers to diﬀerences in the “leisure-and-income sets” available to agents. Roemer
([32], p.75 and passim) talks about the “exploitation-welfare criterion”.
56
Claim 12b holds also in the approach proposed by Arneson ([1], pp.212-3) whereby exploitative relations
violate the principle that “Those who make equal productive sacriﬁces are equally deserving of economic
remuneration”. Desert is measured against the time (and eﬀort) spent in production, while discounting
natural abilities and skills as morally arbitrary. See also Elster ([8], p.202) and Reiman ([29], pp.9ﬀ).
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ν

ν

the distribution of social labour and let αcmin ∈ φ (cνmin ) and αcmax ∈ φ (cνmax ) be the outcomes

of social production activity. Then, for all ν ∈ N , it seems natural to deﬁne κν (P, s, z) as
the average skill level at allocation z: κν (P, s, z) ≡ κ (s, z) ≡

ν∈N
ν∈N

λν

sν λν

. Alternatively, one

may argue that LR (z) should be equal to the labour time that would be necessary for each
agent to produce the ERBs autarkically. In this case, one should set κν (P, s, z) ≡

1
,
sν

for all

ν ∈ N.
In economies with homogeneous labour, the contribution view and the well-being view
coincide but this is not generally true, and diﬀerent approaches will have rather diﬀerent
normative and positive implications. As the previous discussion shows, our analysis provides
the formal and conceptual framework to rigorously examine these diﬀerences.

7

Conclusions

This paper has laid out the foundations of UEL exploitation theory by rigorously formulating
and examining the intuitions common to all approaches. We have ﬁrst identiﬁed the basic
conceptual structure of UEL theory, including the notions of exploitation reference bundles
and the labour associated with them. Then, we have formulated its core intuitions as a
series of formally weak and theoretically robust Claims, collected in axiom LE. We have
shown that our analysis is descriptively accurate: all of the main approaches indeed satisfy
axiom LE (and therefore Claims 1-9). Finally, we have shown that our analysis, and in
particular the domain axiom LE, provides the framework to analyse various normatively
relevant issues, and can shed light on the diﬀerences between UEL exploitation theory and
other approaches, as well as on the diﬀerences between alternative UEL deﬁnitions.
To be sure, this descriptive exercise does not provide an answer to the issue of the normative relevance of UEL exploitation theory, or a justiﬁcation for the focus on labour as the
variable of normative concern. Nonetheless, a clear statement of the foundations of UEL
theory represents a fundamental step to tackle these issues. Indeed, this paper provides a
novel, rigorous axiomatic framework in which to address them and to identify an appropriate deﬁnition of exploitation starting from ﬁrst principles. For, if LE deﬁnes the domain of
admissible UEL exploitation forms, then one may try to identify the normatively relevant
properties that a deﬁnition should satisfy and that perhaps uniquely characterise one deﬁnition within the admissible set. From this perspective, some central insights of exploitation
28

theory, such as the existence of a relation between class and exploitation status (Roemer’s
[32] celebrated Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle) or the correspondence between
positive proﬁts and the exploitation of at least the poorest segments of the working class
(see, for example, the Proﬁt-Exploitation Correspondence Principle recently proposed by
Veneziani and Yoshihara [47, 46]) may be reformulated as axiomatic requirements.
To be sure, both the equivalence between positive proﬁts and the existence of exploitation,
and the correspondence between class and exploitation status have usually been considered
as theoretical results, which hold under some conditions but not others.57 Nonetheless their
central relevance in UEL exploitation theory is such that their epistemological status is
as postulates: they are properties that any UEL deﬁnition should satisfy and alternative
deﬁnitions have often been proposed and compared in the literature based on whether they
preserve them (see, for example, Roemer [32], pp.148-153).
Similarly, one may argue that an appropriate deﬁnition of exploitation should rule out the
possibility that at a given allocation all agents be exploiters or exploited (as noted in section
5 above, LE allows for this possibility). One way to do so is by explicitly formalising the
crucial relational aspect inherent in exploitative relations, such that if an agent is exploited,
she must be exploited by someone, and vice versa if an exploiter exists, she must be exploiting
someone, as suggested by Yoshihara and Veneziani [54]:
Relational Exploitation (RE): At any equilibrium allocation z ∈ Z, the two subsets
N ter and N ted are such that N ter 6= ∅ if and only if N ted 6= ∅.

Within the domain identiﬁed by LE, are there any deﬁnitions that capture important
normative intuitions of UEL exploitation theory, such as the correspondence between class
and exploitation status, the relation between exploitation and proﬁts, and RE? If not, and
an impossibility result followed from the imposition of these properties, this would arguably
raise serious questions about some of the key intuitions of UEL theory, or indeed about the
viability of the UEL approach itself.58
Some preliminary results by Yoshihara and Veneziani [54, 52, 47, 46] suggest that the
set of deﬁnitions that satisfy LE and these additional properties is actually non-empty and,
57

As in the classic literature on the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem. See, among the many others,

Morishima [25]; Roemer [31]; Krause [20], Fleurbaey [13]; Flaschel [11, 12]; Yoshihara [53].
58
For the opposite view, and a rejection of the intuition behind RE, see Roemer ([32], chapter 4).
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among all of the main approaches, the only one satisfying all properties is Deﬁnition 4: if
either Deﬁnition 1 or Deﬁnition 2 is adopted, there are allocations in which RE is violated
and all agents are exploited; and there are allocations in which proﬁts are positive but no
propertyless worker is exploited.
Although these results are preliminary and hold in speciﬁc economic settings, they do
suggest that the axiomatic road investigated in this paper is both insightful and promising.
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